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We weigh into the debate about whether rising productivity is ever a consequence rather than a cause
of exporting. Exporting and investing to raise productivity are complimentary activities. For lower-productivity
firms, incurring the fixed costs of such investments is justifiable only if accompanied by the larger
sales volumes that come with exporting. Lower foreign tariffs will induce these firms to simultaneously
export and invest in productivity. In contrast, lower foreign tariffs will induce higher-productivity
firms to export without investing, as in Melitz (2003). We model this econometrically using a heterogeneous
response model. Unique 'plant-specific' tariff cuts serve as our instrument for the decision of Canadian
plants to start exporting to the United States. We find that those lower-productivity Canadian plants
that were induced by the tariff cuts to start exporting (a) increased their labor productivity, (b) engaged
in more product innovation, and (c) had high adoption rates of advanced manufacturing technologies.
These new exporters also increased their domestic (Canadian) market share at the expense of non-exporters,
which suggests that the labor productivity gains reflect underlying gains in TFP. In contrast, we find
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dtrefler@rotman.utoronto.caDoes exporting raise productivity? The seminal contributions to the topic by Clerides, Lach, and
Tybout (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) provide a clear ‘no’ to this question. The same conclu-
sion appears in many subsequent contributions, including Bernard and Wagner (1997), Delgado,
Fariñas, and Ruano (2002) and Bernard and Jensen (2004). However, a large number of researchers
have found varying degrees of support for a positive effect of exporting on productivity e.g.,
Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000), Baldwin and Gu (2003), Van Biesebroeck (2004), Lileeva (2004),
Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi, and Sokoloff (2005), Fernandes and Isgut (2006), Park, Yang, Shi,
and Jiang (2006), Aw, Roberts, and Winston (2007) and De Loecker (forthcoming). Any study
examining whether starting to export raises productivity must confront two issues. First, there
is an ironclad consensus in the literature that starting to export is endogenous: more productive
plants choose to export. Second, if starting to export raises productivity, what are the mechanisms?
It is hard to believe that there could be large productivity gains unless ﬁrms actively engaged in
costly productivity-enhancing investments such as the adoption of advanced manufacturing tech-
nologies, the use of just-in-time production techniques, and product restructuring (the elimination
of less successful products and the improvement of more successful products). When the decisions
to start exporting and to invest in raising productivity are both endogenous, a set of econometric
and policy issues emerge that have been ignored to date. These issues are similar to those raised
in other contexts by Imbens and Angrist (1994), Card (2001) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
The reason for linking the decisions to export and invest is that they are complimentary ac-
tivities. When a ﬁrm does not export, the productivity gains from investing raise proﬁts only on
domestic sales. One the other hand, when a ﬁrm exports, the productivity gains from investing
raise proﬁts on both domestic and foreign sales. Thus, exporting raises the returns to investing in
productivity. This complementarity appears in Ekholm and Midelfart (2005), Yeaple (2005), Bustos
(2005), Atkeson and Burstein (2006), Costantini and Melitz (2007) and Ederington and McCalman
(forthcoming) who provide conditions under which a reduction in the foreign tariff induces ﬁrms
to simultaneously export and invest.
All of these papers allow for heterogeneity in initial productivity as in Melitz (2003). Produc-
tivity gains are then uniquely determined by the ﬁrm’s initial productivity. (Atkeson and Burstein
2006 and Costantini and Melitz 2007 are exceptions.) In practice, however, we observe substantial
heterogeneity in productivity gains even after conditioning on initial productivity, exporter status,
and the decision to invest. Stories abound of ﬁrms that fail to implement new technologies as
1successfully as their competitors — one need only think of Ford versus Toyota — and these stories
are conﬁrmed by econometric studies e.g., Aw et al. (2007, table 6). Once one allows for two
sources of heterogeneity, in initial productivity and in productivity growth from investing, things
quickly become complicated. In particular, if the productivity beneﬁts of starting to export vary
across ﬁrms then many of the parameters of interest for policy are not identiﬁed. For example, the
impact of exporting on productivity (the average treatment effect) and the impact of exporting on
productivity for those who export (the effect of treatment on the treated) are not identiﬁed. Imbens
and Angrist (1994) show that if there is a valid instrument for exporting then what is identiﬁed
is the average productivity gains from exporting for ﬁrms that are induced to export because of the
instrument. In this study we will be able to identify the average productivity gains for Canadian
ﬁrms that were induced to export to the United States because of the U.S. tariff cuts mandated by
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
One way of thinking about the role of instruments is in terms of the very different conclusions
drawn by Bernard and Jensen (1999) for the United States and De Loecker (forthcoming) for Slove-
nia. Slovenian ﬁrms likely started exporting because of improved access to the European Union
and, as a pre-requisite to joining European Union supply chains, Slovenian ﬁrms likely invested
heavily in reducing product defect rates and lowering costs. The implicit instrument — entry
into the European Union — picks off new exporters that were investing. In contrast, most U.S.
plants ﬁnd themselves in a domestic market that is large enough to justify investing even without
access to foreign markets. As Bernard and Jensen showed, plants in their U.S. sample likely started
exporting because improved productivity from previous investing pushed them past the Melitz
(2003) cut-off. These new exporters thus did not experience additional productivity gains from
starting to export. The implicit instrument — past productivity growth — picks off new exporters
that started investing before exporting. More generally, different ﬁrms have different degrees of
complementarity between exporting and investing and thus have heterogeneous post-exporting
investment strategies and productivity responses. Since different instruments yield different pre-
dictions about who exports, different instruments yield different results about the relationship
between exporting, investing and productivity.
ThisobservationaboutinstrumentsiscentraltoworkbyImbensandAngrist(1994), Card(2001)
and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). It means that the policy conclusions drawn about the beneﬁts
of starting to export will depend on the choice of instrument. It is thus surprising that not a single
2existing study has used a policy variable as an instrument for starting to export. We will use the U.S.
tariff cuts mandated by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement as an instrument for the decision
of Canadian plants to start exporting. The tariff cut is plant-speciﬁc. That is, we link the tariff-cut
data to a plant’s commodity data in order to compute the average tariff cut experienced by the
plant.
We are not, of course, the ﬁrst to use instruments. Clerides et al. (1998) and subsequent papers
that adopted their pioneering methodology brilliantly use the dynamic structure of panel data
to generate instruments. Clerides et al. instrument for exporting using exchange rates, plant
age, plant business type and lagged values of capital. The literature spawned by the pioneering
methodology of Bernard and Jensen (1999) rarely uses any instruments. Two exceptions are Van
Biesebroeck (2004) and Park et al. (2006), but their instruments are also not policy variables.1
This paper is related to a number of empirical studies that connect starting to export with
investing. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2005) and Alvarez and Lopez (2005) provide some weak
evidence that their estimates of positive impacts of exporting on productivity are mediated by
higher levels of investment and worker training. Bustos (2005) ﬁnds a correlation between changes
in technology spending and starting to export for Argentinean plants. Aw et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
ﬁrms which both export and do R&D have higher subsequent productivity growth. They also
ﬁnd a positive cross-equation correlation between their export and R&D probits, which suggests
that exporting and investing are simultaneous decisions. Baldwin, Beckstead, and Caves (2002)
and Baldwin and Gu (2004) ﬁnd that exporters are relatively more specialized in the products they
produce, invest more in R&D and training, and adopt more advanced manufacturing technologies.
Feinberg and Keane (2006) and Keane and Feinberg (forthcoming) ﬁnd that the 1983-96 increase in
tradebetweenU.S.multinationalsandtheirCanadianafﬁliateswasdrivenbytechnologyadoption
(the adoption of just-in-time techniques). Thus, there is evidence that various types of investment
act as mediators between starting to export and rising productivity.
Our paper is also related to plant-level studies of the impact of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement. See Treﬂer (2004), Lileeva (2004), Baldwin and Gu (2003, 2006), Baldwin, Caves, and
Gu (2005), Baggs (2005) and Baggs and Brander (2006). Of particular interest, Baldwin and Gu
(2006) ﬁnd that exporters produce fewer products and have larger production runs. This may
1Our work is best thought of as falling into the Bernard and Jensen branch of the literature rather than the Clerides
et al. branch. We do not have the annual data on exporting needed to implement the Clerides et al. approach.
3explain the positive productivity effects of exporting found by Baldwin and Gu (2003). See Gaston
and Treﬂer (1997) and Head and Ries (1999, 2001) for industry-level analyses.
Finally, the literature spawned by Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) asks a
bigger and more difﬁcult question than the one posed here. It asks about the effect of exporting on
productivity. We ask about the effect of exporting on productivity for those Canadian plants that
were induced to export because of U.S. tariff cuts. Our results suggest that the larger question is in
fact very difﬁcult to answer. This is discussed in the conclusions where we argue that our results
in no way contradict those of Clerides et al. and Bernard and Jensen.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe our sample of 5,247 Canadian
plants that were not exporters before the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was implemented. Almost
half of these began exporting after the FTA was implemented. In sections 3 and 5 we outline
our empirical strategy for identifying and estimating the heterogeneous productivity effects of
improved access to the U.S. market. The strategy is based on the Marginal Treatment Effect of
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005). In sections 4 and 6 we provide estimates of the impact of the
FTA tariff cuts on labour productivity growth and show that there is indeed heterogeneity. Lower
productivity plants experienced large gains while higher productivity plants experienced no gains.
In section 7 we show that the group of plants that experienced the large labour productivity gains
were also the group of plants that invested most heavily in innovation and technology adoption. In
section 8 we discuss the most signiﬁcant of several weaknesses of our empirical work, namely, that
we measure productivity by value added per worker rather than TFP. To partially address this, we
show that the same plants that were induced to start exporting, to raise their labour productivity
and to invest in new products and technologies were also the same plants that grabbed substantial
domestic market share away from non-exporters. This suggests that these new exporters did
indeed increase their TFP. Finally, a model of the complementarity between starting to export and
investing in productivity is needed in order to interpret the form of heterogeneity that we estimate.
This appears in the next section.
1. A Model of Selection into Investing and Exporting
Consider a model with two countries, home (Canada) and foreign (United States). Foreign values
are denoted with an asterisk. Consumers have CES preferences and the market structure is mo-
nopolistic competition. A home ﬁrm producing variety i faces home demand q(i) = p(i)−σA and
4foreign demand q∗(i) = p∗(i)−σA∗ where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
A is a measure of domestic market size, A∗ is a measure of foreign market size, p(i) is the price
charged at home, and p∗(i) is the price (inclusive of tariff) charged abroad. Let τ(i) − 1 be the ad
valorem tariff the ﬁrm faces when selling into the foreign market. Turning to costs, a standardized
bundleofinputscosts c andproduces ϕ0
0(i) unitsofoutput. ϕ0
0(i) measuresproductivity. However,
it is easier to work with a transformation of productivity, namely, ϕ0 ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ(ϕ0
0)σ−1. We
are only interested in the ﬁrm’s static optimization problem. We therefore treat the equilibrium
outcomes A, A∗ and c = 1 as exogenous parameters. In what follows we drop all i indices.
Consider the standard Melitz (2003) problem as described in Helpman (2006). For a ﬁxed cost
FE the ﬁrm can export. Let E = 1 if the ﬁrm exports and E = 0 otherwise. Then the ﬁrm’s





for E = 0,1. See Helpman (2006, equations 1-2). It follows that the ﬁrm exports when ϕ0 exceeds
the Melitz cut-off FE/(τ−σA∗).
In addition to an exporting decision, we assume that for a ﬁxed cost FI the ﬁrm can raise its




− EFE − FI. (2)
The ﬁrm’s problem is most succinctly characterized by considering the difference between
proﬁts for (i) exporting and investing and (ii) neither exporting nor investing. From equations
(1)-(2), this difference is






(ϕ1 − ϕ0)A − FI] + [(ϕ1 − ϕ0)τ−σA∗
i
. (3)
The ﬁrst term in brackets equals the increase in proﬁts from exporting without investing in pro-
ductivity. The second term in brackets equals the increase in proﬁts from investing in productivity
without exporting. The third term captures the complementarity between investing and exporting
– it is the increase in variable proﬁts that results from both exporting and investing as opposed
to doing just one or the other. It is necessarily positive because productivity gains raise proﬁts on
2It makes no difference to our conclusions if there are only marginal costs of investing or both marginal and ﬁxed
costs of investing.
5Figure 1. The Optimal Choices of Exporting and Investing
























all units sold, including foreign sales, and hence raise the proﬁts from exporting. This comple-
mentarity can also be thought of as a familiar market size effect that appears in many different
models.
The ﬁrm’s optimal choices are illustrated in ﬁgure 1 where initial productivity ϕ0 is plotted
against the productivity gains from investing ϕ1 − ϕ0. When productivity gains are small the ﬁrm
never invests and we are in a Melitz world: the ﬁrm exports if and only if initial productivity is
above the Melitz threshold. The Melitz threshold is the vertical line in ﬁgure 1. Given that the ﬁrm
is exporting, it will invest if and only if the productivity gains are above some threshold.3 This
threshold is the horizontal line in ﬁgure 1. For the empirical work to follow, the interesting region
is where the ﬁrst two terms in equation (3) are negative so that the ﬁrm will not export without
investing and will not invest without exporting. In this region the complementarity between
exporting and investing may nevertheless make it worthwhile for the ﬁrm to export and invest.
To pin this down more precisely, suppose that in this region the ﬁrm must choose either (i) to
export and invest or (ii) to do neither. The ﬁrm is indifferent between these two choices when
π1(1) = π0(0) or, from equation (3), when
ϕ1 − ϕ0 = −ϕ0
τ−σA∗
A + τ−σA∗ +
FI + FE
A + τ−σA∗. (4)
Above this line the ﬁrm prefers to export and invest. Below it, the ﬁrm prefers to do neither.
3π1(1) > π0(1) iff (ϕ1 − ϕ0)(A + τ−σA∗) − FI > 0. Re-stated, π1(1) > π0(1) iff ϕ1 − ϕ0 is above the threshold
FI/(A + τ−σA∗).
6In ﬁgure 1 the ﬁrm never invests without exporting. Because investing without exporting is of
no interest for the empirical work on exporting that follows, we have assumed implicitly that FI is
so large that the ﬁrm never invests without exporting. The appendix provides the analysis for the
case where FI is small. This leads to only a minor modiﬁcation of the ﬁgure 1 analysis.4
We turn next to the effects of an improvement in access to the foreign market because of a
fall in the foreign tariff τ. As shown in ﬁgure 2, the downward-sloping equation (4) rotates
clockwise around its ﬁxed vertical intercept. Thus, some ﬁrms that previously neither exported
nor invested now ﬁnd themselves choosing to both export and invest. For this group, the causal
effect on productivity of improved market access is given by equation (4). The fall in τ also causes a
leftward shift of the Melitz cut-off. See ﬁgure 2. Thus, some ﬁrms that previously neither exported
nor invested now ﬁnd themselves exporting without investing. For these ﬁrms improved market
access has no causal effect on productivity. We will sometimes refer to the ﬁrms in the shaded
regions as ‘switchers.’
The primary result of this section is summarized in ﬁgure 3. It shows that improved access to
foreign markets raises productivity for some plants and not for others i.e., productivity responses
are heterogeneous. This has important implications for empirical work. No researcher has ever
adequately reported how productivity responses vary with initial productivity.5
A much less important result of this section is that the complementarity between exporting and
investing leads to the particular form of heterogeneity shown in ﬁgure 3. A priori there is no reason
to think that this will be a dominant effect in a richer model that allows for other factors and other
sources of heterogeneity. For now we simply note that the form of heterogeneity displayed in
ﬁgure 3 is what we ﬁnd empirically. We also note that the empirical analysis to come imposes none
of the theoretical structure developed in this section.6
Relationship to the Literature
4Speciﬁcally, deﬁne ϕ
0 = FE/(τ−σA∗) − FI/A. For ϕ0 ≥ ϕ
0 the analysis presented in the main text is complete. In
particular, the choice of investing without exporting is always dominated. For ϕ0 < ϕ
0 there is a region of the parameter
space for which investing without exporting is preferred. This region disappears when FI is high enough that ϕ
0 < 0.
5Delgado et al. (2002) comes closest in estimating pre- and post-entry distribution functions of productivity growth
separately for small and large ﬁrms. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2005) and Park et al. (2006) imaginatively estimate effects
for young and old ﬁrms.
6In ﬁgure 3, to the immediate left of the Melitz cut-off we have drawn a zero productivity response. In fact, the
response is an average of the zero responses of those who start exporting without investing and the positive responses
of those who invest when they start exporting. For ease of exposition and because the latter group is likely smaller, we
have drawn the productivity effects as zero in this region.
7Figure 2. Switching Behaviour Induced by Improved Foreign Market Access
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Figure 3. The Causal Effect on Productivity of Improved Foreign Market Access















8Our paper is related to a growing literature on exporting and investing in productivity. See Ekholm
and Midelfart (2005), Yeaple (2005), Bustos (2005) and Ederington and McCalman (forthcoming).
These authors all assume that there is heterogeneity in initial productivity ϕ0. However, none of
them allows for heterogeneity in productivity gains ϕ1 − ϕ0. We require heterogeneity in both ϕ0
and ϕ1 − ϕ0. Implicitly, we have been assuming that there are ﬁrms scattered over all the regions
in ﬁgures 1-3. If there are no ﬁrms in a given region then that region is irrelevant and the data
will tell us this. In contrast, previous papers assume that there are ﬁrms in only a small part of
ﬁgures 1-3, speciﬁcally, along some line ϕ1 − ϕ0 = a + bϕ0.7 The result obtained in these papers
depends on where the line is assumed to lie in ﬁgures 1-3.8 The assumption of heterogeneity in
ϕ0 but only limited heterogeneity in ϕ1 − ϕ0 is helpful in allowing these authors to address a set
of questions not considered in our paper. However, for our purposes, ruling out heterogeneity
in ϕ1 − ϕ0 leads to a prediction that is inconsistent with the data. As we will see, for all but the
smallest and largest ϕ0 we observe exporters, non-exporters and switchers. This observation is
inconsistent with the predictions of these earlier models, but is fully consistent with our model
featuring two-dimensional heterogeneity.
2. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the Data
A. A Brief History of the FTA
We are interested in the effects of improved market access on ﬁrms’ decisions to export and invest.
We use the U.S. tariff reductions mandated under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to
examine these effects. Negotiations for the FTA began in September, 1985. There was considerable
uncertainty about whether there would be an Agreement until after the November 1988 general
election brought the Conservatives back for a second term. The Agreement went into effect on
January 1, 1989. By 1996, the last year for which we have plant-level data, each HS10 tariff was
down to less than one-ﬁfth of its 1988 level and by 1998 all tariffs were eliminated. See Brander
(1991) and Thompson (1993) for details.
7Forexample, inYeaple(2005)andBustos(2005)whenaﬁrminvestsitraisesitsproductivityto ϕ1 = (b+1)ϕ0 where
b > 0 . Thus, they only consider ﬁrms that are on the line ϕ1 − ϕ0 = bϕ0. In Ederington and McCalman (forthcoming),
when a ﬁrm invests it raises its productivity to ϕ1 = a where a > ϕ0. Thus, they only consider ﬁrms on the line
ϕ1 − ϕ0 = a − ϕ0.
8For concreteness, suppose that this line is upward-sloping and crosses the downward-sloping line in ﬁgure 3 at
some point ϕ∗
0. Since all ﬁrms lie on this upward-sloping line, it follows that all ﬁrms with ϕ0 < ϕ∗
0 are below our ﬁgure
3 line and hence neither export nor invest. All ﬁrms with ϕ0 > ϕ∗
0 are above our line and hence export and invest. The
only ﬁrms that are induced to export as a result of a marginal foreign tariff cut are ﬁrms with ϕ0 = ϕ∗
0.




































































We have plant-level export status for 1984 and 1996. This means that we cannot examine the
annual dynamics that are the focus of the literature spawned by the seminal papers of Roberts
and Tybout (1997) and Clerides et al. (1998). This also means that we do not know the plant’s ﬁrst
export date, information that is central in Bernard and Jensen (1999). Fortunately, there is abundant
evidence that most exporting began only after implementation of the FTA and this will be enough
information for our purposes. Figure 4 plots real Canadian manufacturing exports to the United
States. Data are from Treﬂer (2004). These exports changed little in the 1985-88 period. They also
changed little during the severe 1989-91 recession, the worst recession in Canadian manufacturing
since the 1930s. However, exports climbed spectacularly after 1991, almost doubling in just ﬁve
year. Romalis (forthcoming) shows a similar time proﬁle for exports of goods that were subject
to the largest tariff cuts. Feinberg and Keane (2005, 2006) use Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
data on shipments to the United States by U.S.-owned Canadian afﬁliates and ﬁnd that there was
no increase until 1988 and that most of the increase was from 1992 onwards. Thus, for plants that
began exporting between 1984 and 1996, most likely started after implementation of the FTA and
indeed, after 1991.
A second problem is that the 1984 export status data do not indicate the destination of exports.
However, 83% of Canadian manufacturing exports in 1984 went to the United States and this
number rose after implementation of the FTA. Thus, the vast majority of new entry into export
10markets during the FTA period likely involved entry into the U.S. market.
In 1984 there were 5,417 plants that (a) did not export in 1984 and (b) survived until 1996. Of
these, only 170 have missing data, leaving us with 5,247 plants. Criterion (b) is needed in order
for us to observe productivity growth until 1996. In appendix B we include plants that did not
survive until 1996 and ﬁnd larger productivity estimates from improved market access. We deﬁne
anexporterasaplantthatexportsanyamount. AppendixGshowsthatourresultsarenotsensitive
to exporter deﬁnitions involving higher export thresholds.9
In addition to the 1984 and 1996 annual surveys of manufacturing, the 1979 and 1990 surveys
were the only other surveys to ask the export question. The 1979 and 1990 data are used in
appendix C. A very small number of the 1984 nonexporters exported in 1979. Our results are
virtually unchanged when these 1979 exporters are excluded. Likewise, our results are virtually
unchanged when we exclude plants that started exporting by 1990 but stopped exporting by 1996.
Appendix C also includes additional analysis of export stoppers.
B. Description of the plant-speciﬁc tariff variable
We construct the FTA-mandated change in the plant-speciﬁc, commodity-weighted average U.S.
tariff faced by Canadian plants. Let τjt be the U.S. tariff against Canadian imports of HS6 com-
modity j in year t. τjt is aggregated up from the underlying HS10 data using import weights.
Let qijt be plant i’s sales of commodity j in year t. The FTA-mandated average tariff cut is
Σj(τj,1988 − τj,1996)ωij where ωij ≡ qij,1996/Σjqij,1996. We use 1996 output weights in order to avoid
the usual downward bias caused by contemporaneous weights i.e., the higher was the tariff in
1988 the lower were Canadian sales qij,1988. Since the ﬁrst full year that the U.S. reported trade
and tariffs in the HS classiﬁcation was 1989, we use τj,1989 in place of τj,1988. Also, because tariffs
were very close to 0 by 1996, we simply set τj,1996 = 0. This has the added advantage that it makes
our measure of tariff changes invariant to compositional changes in the HS10 import weights used
to aggregate up to HS6. Note that there will be additional issues with our tariff change measure
that will be explained when we come to the empirical results. Also, the reader may have concerns
about whether the tariff cuts are exogenous to the ﬁrm. We will provide evidence on this below.10
9The 1984 survey was administered to plants that accounted for a remarkable 91% of total manufacturing output.
10Tariffs are deﬁned as duties divided by imports. Statutory rates would have been better, but we do not have access
to an electronic ﬁle of statutory rates. Further, Treﬂer (2004) shows that results based on statutory rates are similar to
those based on duties divided by imports.
11Table 1. Average Plant Characteristics (Deviations from Industry Means)
New Non-
Exporters Exporters Difference
E = 1 E = 0 µ1 − µ0 t
N 2,133 3,114
Log employment, 1984 −.36 −.82 .462 16.94
Log labour productivity, 1984 −.05 −.11 .064 4.15
Annual labour productivity growth, 1988-1996 .01 −.01 .019 7.86
Annual labour productivity growth, 1984-1988 .01 −.01 .026 6.11
Notes: This table reports the means for plants that did not export in 1984 and survived to 1996. Data are
expressed as deviations from the industry mean where the industry consists of all plants in the same SIC4
industry that existed in both 1984 and 1996. It thus also includes continuous exporters.
C. Sample Moments
Table 1 reports some basic sample statistics. Of our 5,247 plants that did not export in 1984, 2,133
reported positive exports in 1996 (E = 1) and 3,114 reported zero exports in 1996 (E = 0). Table 1
provides additional sample statistics that are expressed as differences from the 4-digit SIC industry
mean. The industry is deﬁned as all plants that survived from 1984 to 1996. Subtracting off
industry means partially controls for industry characteristics.
Table 1 makes it clear that new exporters and non-exporters were very different even before
the FTA. Already in 1988, new exporters were only 0.36 log points smaller than the industry
mean whereas nonexporters where 0.82 log points smaller. The difference of 0.462 is statistically
signiﬁcant(t = 16.94). Asdiscussed intheintroduction, wedonothave capitalstockorinvestment
data and so use labour productivity (value added per worker). New exporters were 0.05 log points
less productive than the industry mean, but 0.064 log points more productive than nonexporters
(t = 4.15). Baldwin and Gu (2003) found that new Canadian exporters grew faster than nonex-
porters. In our sample, the growth differential was 0.019 log points per year in the 1988-96 period
(t = 7.86). However, as one might expect from Bernard and Jensen (1999), the growth differential
was similar in the 1984-88 period (0.026 log points, t = 6.11).11
11We started thinking about heterogeneous labour productivity responses because the double difference of labour
productivity growth (1988-96 growth less 1984-88 growth for new exporters less nonexporters) is large for smaller, less
productive plants and zero for larger, more productive plants. We will show this more formally below.
123. An Econometric Model
We next turn to specifying the simplest possible econometric model that allows us to identify and
estimate heterogenous productivity responses to increased market access. Essentially, we regress
1988-96 productivity growth on a starting-to-export dummy and use the tariff as an instrument.
We then use a much smaller sample of 521 plants matched to an innovation and technology survey
to conﬁrm that the group of plants for which productivity responses were largest is also the group
of plants for which innovation and technology-adoption responses were largest.
Rather than working in productivity levels ϕ0 and ϕ1 we work in productivity changes so as to
net out contaminating level ﬁxed effects. Let ∆ϕ1 be the plant’s productivity growth had it started
exporting (E = 1). Let ∆ϕ0 be the plant’s productivity growth had it never exported (E = 0).
Our unit of analysis is the plant, but we suppress plant subscripts. As is standard, we decompose
productivity growth into observable and unobservable components:
∆ϕ0 = β0(X) + U0 for E = 0 (5)
∆ϕ1 = β0(X) + β1(X) + U0 + U1 for E = 1 (6)
where β0(X) and β1(X) are components that vary with observables X. X will include initial
productivity ϕ0. U0 and U1 are residual components. We assume that they are mean zero. We are
interested in the causal effect of improved market access, via exporting, on productivity growth.
This causal effect is
∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ0 = β1(X) + U1 (7)
The core econometric problem is unobserved heterogeneity: U1 varies across plants. However,
even observed heterogeneity β1(X) has not been adequately addressed in the literature.
For any one plant, if E = 1 we observe ∆ϕ1 and if E = 0 we observe ∆ϕ0. That is, observed
productivity growth ∆ϕ is given by
∆ϕ = ∆ϕ1E +∆ϕ0(1− E) = β0(X) + β1(X)E + (U0 + U1E) (8)
where we have used equations (5)-(6). This is our ﬁrst estimating equation.





1 P(X,∆τ) ≥ UE
0 P(X,∆τ) < UE
Export Probit. (9)
13Table 2. Probit of the Probability of Starting to Export Between 1984 and 1996
Independent Variables Coefﬁcient χ2 p-value Marginal Effect
∆τ 0.89 265 0.000 .12
Log labour productivity, 1984 0.26 33 0.000 .05
Log employment, 1984 0.36 233 0.000 .12
Annual log labour prod. growth, 1984-88 0.89 30 0.000 .04
SIC4 ﬁxed effects (208 industries) Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (9) for the 5,247 plants that did not export in 1984. E = 1 for
the 2,133 plants that exported in 1996. E = 0 for the remaining 3,114 plants that did not export in 1996.
P(X,∆τ) ≡ Prob{E = 1|X,∆τ} is the probability of becoming an exporter given plant-level charac-
teristics X and the U.S. tariff cut ∆τ.
Equations (8) and (9) form our econometric model. ∆τ is the excluded variable in equation (8)
and will serve as our instrument. Notice that none of our earlier theory is being imposed on the
econometric model.
A. Estimates of the Probit Model
In 1984 there were 5,247 Canadian plants that were non-exporters. For each of these plants, let
E = 1 if the plant was exporting in 1996 and let E = 0 if the plant was not exporting in 1996. Table
2 provides the results of a probit on E. In addition to the plant-speciﬁc tariff, the regressors include
the log of labour productivity and employment in 1984, annual log labour productivity growth
in 1984-88 and ﬁxed effects for each of the 208 industries in Canada’s 4-digit Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC). Higher productivity plants, larger plants, and plants with rapidly growing
productivity were all more likely to become new exporters. These are not surprising results. The
new result is about ∆τ. As judged by the χ2-test statistic and the marginal effect, the U.S. tariff cut
is at least as important as previously considered variables.
We must now provide more information about our tariff variable ∆τ. When estimating the
probit using the tariff cut variable described in the data section above, we ﬁnd that it is not
statistically signiﬁcant and has a very small marginal effect. This puzzled us at ﬁrst until we
realized that the distribution of the tariff cuts is very skewed – a few plants received very large
tariff cuts that were often in excess of 50%. Such tariffs were likely well above the level needed to
choke off imports, especially since the largest tariff cuts were in ‘low-end’ manufacturing where
proﬁt margins are often less than 10%. Thus, for tariffs that exceed a prohibitory threshold, tariff
14variation is meaningless. As a result, when we use our continuous tariff-cut variable in the probit
we ﬁnd that it is not statistically signiﬁcant. It turns out that the problem is easily solved by
redeﬁning ∆τ to be a binary variable: ∆τ = 1 if the plant’s tariff cut exceeds some threshold
∆τ and ∆τ = 0 otherwise. In table 2, the threshold ∆τ is the average tariff cut across all 5,247
plants. However, when we present our core results below, we will consider six other very different
alternative deﬁnitions of the threshold ∆τ and show that our results are insensitive to the choice of
threshold.12
Let b P(X,∆τ) be the table 2 estimate of P(X,∆τ). It is common to estimate the effects of treatment
either by matching treated and untreated units based on the ‘propensity score’ b P or by using b P as
an instrument. This will be part of what we do. We therefore describe b P in much more detail than
is the reporting norm. This is done in table 3 where we group plants according to their predicted
probabilities of entry b P. The table reports sample statistics for each group. For example, the third
row deals with those plants whose predicted probability of entry lies between 0.15 and 0.25. There
are ﬁve points highlighted by the table.
First, theestimatedprobitdoesnotappeartosufferanysystematicmis-prediction. Forexample,
in the third row, 148 plants began exporting (column 3), 668 did not start exporting (column 4) and
the rate of entry was 0.18 = 148/(148 + 668) (column 2). Since the actual entry rate of 0.18 lies
in the interval of predicted entry rates (0.15,0.25) we conclude that the probit did a good job of
prediction. Comparing columns 1 and 2, the actual entry rate is in the predicted interval for 10
of 11 groups. Based on this we conclude that the probit does not have any systematic biases in
predicting entry.
Second, some of the groups are very thin on either new exporters or non-exporters. Above the
upper horizontal line in table 3 there are very few new exporters and below the lower horizontal
line there are very few non-exporters. This makes it difﬁcult to reliably estimate differences
between new exporters and non-exporters. Results for these low and high values of b P should
therefore be treated with caution.
Third, b P is highly correlated with initial labour productivity and employment size. Columns 5
and 6 show initial labour productivity and employment. The baseline is plants in the ﬁrst row. For
12There is something uncomfortable about converting a continuous variable into a binary one. However, it is impor-
tant here to keep the aim in focus. We are not interested in accurately estimating the elasticity of export participation
with respect to tariff cuts. Rather, we are interested in an instrument that has decent explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage
i.e., in the probit.





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 .00-.05 .06 15 243 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.05
2 .05-.15 .08 51 596 0.07 0.44 0.49 0.15
3 .15-.25 .18 148 668 0.13 0.50 0.45 0.25
4 .25-.35 .29 206 506 0.16 0.71 0.48 0.31
5 .35-.45 .43 274 369 0.18 1.05 0.52 0.34
6 .45-.55 .50 293 289 0.20 1.23 0.49 0.36
7 .55-.65 .62 335 204 0.20 1.41 0.44 0.34
8 .65-.75 .72 339 131 0.22 1.60 0.39 0.31
9 .75-.85 .77 289 88 0.24 2.09 0.23 0.25
10 .85-.95 .87 130 19 0.45 2.35 0.19 0.16
11 .95-1.00 .98 53 1 0.35 2.41 0.62 0.02
Notes: This table reports characteristics of plants by b P(X,∆τ). Column 1 indicates the plant type. For example, the ﬁrst
row lists statistics for all plants with b P(X,∆τ) ∈ (0.00,0,05). Column 2 is the proportion of plants that started exporting
between 1984 and 1996. It equals column 3 divided by the sum of columns 3 and 4. In column 5, log productivity
in 1984 is the difference between log productivity in the indicated row minus log productivity in row 1. Similarly for
column 6 log employment in 1984. Column 7 is the average of ∆τ. Column 8 is the average marginal effect from the
probit.
example, plants with b P ∈ (0.15,0.25) had 1984 labour productivity that was 0.13 log points higher
than plants with b P ∈ (0.00,0.05) and 1984 employment that was 0.50 log points higher. Looking
down the rows we see that initial labour productivity and employment size rise sharply with b P.
Indeed, these two variables are the primary drivers of between-row variation in b P. Thus, b P is
acting as an index of labour productivity and employment size. Ricardo’s logic implies that more
productive plants will be larger and hence employs more workers. We therefore sometimes treat
b P as an aggregator of two correlates of underlying productivity — labour productivity and size —
where the weights are chosen to best predict the impact of productivity on exporting. That is, we
will sometimes interpret b P as a proxy for our theory’s ϕ0.
Fourth, while the between-row variation in b P is driven by initial labour productivity and size,
the within-row variation is driven by ∆τ. This can be seen from column 8 which shows the
estimated marginal effects of ∆τ. These effects are very large. For example, in row 3 the marginal
16effect more than doubles the probability of entry from 0.18 to 0.43 = 0.18+ 0.25.
Fifth, in the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity score matching view of b P, b P is a sufﬁcient
statistic for all information about plant characteristics that is relevant to the exporting decision
i.e., the distribution of X conditional on b P is independent of E. This is the testable ‘balancing’
hypothesis. To examine it, for each of our 11 b P rows we tested whether the mean of 1984 log
labour productivity is the same for E = 0 and E = 1 plants. There was no difference in any of the
11 rows. We repeated this for 1984 log employment and 1984-88 log labour productivity growth
and again always rejected the hypothesis of a difference in X between exporters and non-exporters.
See appendix table 7. This means that once we control for b P there are no differences between new
exporters and nonexporters.13
4. Preliminary Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Productivity Responses
Since heterogeneous response models with unobserved heterogeneity can be complex economet-
rically, we start with the simpler case of observed heterogeneity only. With no unobserved hetero-
geneity, U1 = 0 and equation (8) becomes ∆ϕ = β0(X)+ β1(X)E +U0. E is obviously endogenous
and we instrument it with ∆τ. Recall that ∆ϕ is annual log labour productivity growth averaged
over the 1988-96 period.
Table 4 reports the IV estimates of
∆ϕ = β0qX + β1qE + U0 q = 1,...,5 (10)
separately for each of the ﬁve quintiles of b P(X,∆τ = 0). q indexes quintiles. b P is the probit of table
2 and X collects the regressors in that probit (including 4-digit SIC ﬁxed effects). The ﬁrst column
of table 4 shows the range of b P in each quintile. The second column shows the number of plants.
The third column presents the IV estimates of the β1q when ∆τ is the instrument. We do not want
to take these results seriously just yet. Instead, we wish to use them to make three points.
First, we do not interact E with X. Obviously we do not want to interact E with the ﬁxed
effects, but it is of interest that the interactions of E with employment, productivity and produc-
tivity growth are all statistically insigniﬁcant. This shows that once we condition on b P no useful
13Table 3 provides some informal and preliminary evidence on the exogeneity of the tariff cuts. Looking down column
7, ∆τ is not particularly correlated with b P. (Within rows, ∆τ and b P are of course highly correlated.) That is, ∆τ is
uncorrelated with observable plant characteristics that are correlated with exporting. This is very informal evidence on
the exogeneity of ∆τ. We will provide more formal evidence on the exogeneity of ∆τ below.
17Table 4. Preliminary IV Estimation of Labour Productivity Growth
IV: ∆τ IV: P( X, ∆τ  )  OLS
P( X, ∆τ )  N β1q t β1q t β1q t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.00-0.22 1,049 0.25 6.19 0.22 6.51 0.041 5.34 0.10
0.22-0.34 1,050 0.20 6.18 0.20 6.21 0.030 5.51 0.09
0.34-0.45 1,049 0.13 6.41 0.13 6.40 0.039 7.53 0.09
0.45-0.61 1,050 0.05 2.45 0.05 2.44 0.030 5.54 0.09
0.61-1.00 1,049 0.08 2.00 0.07 1.95 0.022 4.07 0.08
Std. Dev. 
of ∆ϕ
Notes: This table reports estimates of β1q in equation (10). The dependent variable is average annual log labour
productivity growth, 1988-96. The equation is estimated separately for each quintile of the distribution of
b P(X,∆τ = 0). Column 1 gives the range of the quintile. Column 2 gives the number of observations. Column 3
gives the IV results using ∆τ as the instrument. Column 5 gives the IV results using b P(X,∆τ) as the instrument.
Column 7 gives the OLS results. Column 9 gives the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
correlation between E and X remains. This is a restatement of our balancing tests in appendix D. It
provides additional support for our Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity score structure and
thus for our interpretation of b P as a proxy for initial productivity ϕ0.
Second, the hypothesis of homogeneity across quintiles is easily rejected: there is response
heterogeneity that is correlated with observables i.e., with b P. Interestingly, the estimated β1q
are decreasing over the ﬁrst four quintiles. Interpreting b P as initial productivity, this pattern is
consistent with our ﬁgure 3 prediction. The last quintile is not consistent with our prediction.
Third, the estimates are huge. The ﬁrst quintile coefﬁcient of 0.25 means that exporting raises
labour productivity by 25% a year in each of 8 years. This is much larger than the 0.10 within-
quintile standard deviation of annual productivity growth shown in column 9. More importantly,
it is also much larger than the OLS estimate shown in column 7. The two other papers in this line
of research that use IV approaches also ﬁnd IV estimates that are much larger than OLS estimates.
See Van Biesebroeck (2004) and Park et al. (2006).14
An IV estimate that is larger than its OLS counterpart is usually taken as evidence of unob-
14We are referring only to papers in the Bernard and Jensen branch of the literature. See footnote 1 above.
18served response heterogeneity e.g., Card (2001). To understand why, assume for simplicity that
equation (10) has unobserved heterogeneity and no covariates: ∆ϕ = β0q + β1qE + U0 + U1E. Let
∆P ≡ P(X,1)− P(X,0) be the amount by which the tariff cut increases the probability of starting to
export. Then plimβIV
1q = β1q + plimE[U1 ·∆P]/E[∆P] i.e., the IV estimator is the weighted average
of the productivity effects where the weights are ∆P.15 The complementarity between exporting
and investing in productivity would suggest that U1 should be positively correlated with ∆P: a
ﬁrm that expects a larger productivity effect (U1 large) gains a lot from exporting and therefore
would be sensitive to a tariff cut (∆P large). If this complementarity effect is very strong then
plimβIV
1q will be large, just as in table 4. To deal with this problem we will move beyond quintiles
to ﬁner gradations of P in the next section.
We make one last point that will help for what comes in the next section. We have used ∆τ
as the instrument. Econometrically, any monotonic function of ∆τ can be used as an instrument
and b P(X,∆τ) is a typical choice e.g., Imbens and Angrist (1994). If b P were linear in its arguments
then ∆τ and b P would yield identical IV estimates. However, the nonlinearity means that ∆τ and
b P are not perfectly collinear. Hence, b P is a second valid instrument. This use of the functional
form of the probit to create a second instrument is not a desirable property of b P as an instrument.
Fortunately, table 4 shows that it is also not an important property empirically. The IV estimates of
β1q using b P as an instrument (column 5) are almost identical to the IV estimates of β1q using ∆τ as
an instrument (column 3). Thus, we can use either ∆τ or b P as an instrument.
5. The Marginal Treatment Effect
Consider a plant whose manager is unusually good in two senses. First, she jumps on opportuni-
ties in the U.S. market as they present themselves. In terms of our model, recall that a plant exports
when P > UE. Thus our good manager has a small UE. Second, she squeezes large productivity
gains out of a given investment i.e., she has a large U1. Together, these imply that we should expect
a negative correlation between UE and U1 and hence a negative correlation between UE and the
productivity effect of improved market access ∆ϕ1 − ∆ϕ0 = β1 + U1. More formally, we should
expect E[β1 + U1|UE] to be decreasing in UE.
15See Card (2001, page 1142). To hint at why this is the case we adopt the following notation. For any variable y let y be
themeanof y, let y1 bethemeanof y forthoseplantswith∆τ = 1andlet y0 bethemeanof y forthoseplantswith∆τ = 0.
Then the IV estimator is Σ[(∆ϕ−∆ϕ)·∆τ]/Σ[(E− E)·∆τ] = [∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ0]/[E1 − E0] ≈ [∆ϕ1 −∆ϕ0]/[b P(1)− b P(0)]. The
last expression is the LATE estimator. ∆P is the population counterpart to the denominator. The discussion following
equation (11) below links the population moment E[U1∆P] to the numerator.
19Of course UE is not observed so it is useless to condition on it. However, for a plant manager
that is just indifferent between exporting and not exporting it must be that UE = P(X,∆τ). See
equation (9). Restated, we know UE for plants that are induced to export because of the U.S.
tariff cuts. Thus, we are interested in E[β1 + U1|P(X,∆τ)]. This expectation is called the Marginal
Treatment Effect (MTE) and is the effect of exporting on productivity for those plants that were
induced to export because of the U.S. tariff cuts. The Marginal Treatment Effect is due to Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005). See also Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2003).
In terms of ﬁgure 1, P(X,∆τ) = UE corresponds to the lines which demarcate no exporting from
exporting, including the downward-sloping ‘complementarity’ line. The fact that the Marginal
Treatment Effect can be linked directly to our theory is the primary reason that we burdened the
reader with any theory at all.
To see that the Marginal Treatment Effect is identiﬁed, consider the equation (8) expression
∆ϕ = β0 + β1E + (U0 + U1E). Since P is an instrument, E[U0|P] = 0. In addition, the average
value of E given P is just the probability of E: E[E|P] = P.16 Hence,
E[∆ϕ|P] = β0 + β1P + E[U1E|P]. (11)
Consider a plant that has never exported and which lies on our line P = UE. For such a plant, the
tariff cut has two effects. First, it raises P which raises E[∆ϕ|P] by β1. Second, it induces the plant
to switch from E = 0 to E = 1. This raises E[∆ϕ|P] from E[U1 · 0|P] = 0 to E[U1 · 1|P] = E[U1|P].
Combining these two effects, an increase in P raises E[∆ϕ|P] by the Marginal Treatment Effect
E[β1 + U1|P]. Restated, the Marginal Treatment Effect is identiﬁed by the derivative of E[∆ϕ|P]:







Since we observe∆ϕ and can estimate P, we can estimate E[∆ϕ|P] and then differentiate it to obtain
an estimate of E[β1 + U1|P]. This establishes identiﬁcation of the Marginal Treatment Effect. See
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) for a formal proof.
Turning to estimation, we follow the three-step procedure of Carneiro et al. (2003). First, we
estimate equation (11) using a fully non-parametric IV procedure with b P as the instrument. This is
the non-parametric equivalent of what appears in column 5 of table 4. As in that table we continue
16E[E|P] = E[1|P] · P + E[0|P] · (1− P) = 1· P + 0· (1− P) = P.
20to assume β0(X) = β0X and β1(X)P = β1P.17 The procedure returns estimates of β0, β1 and the
residuals i.e., of b β0, b β1 and b ε, respectively. Second, we non-parametrically regress b ε on b P. The
resulting function b εU1E(b P) is an estimate of E[U1E|b P(X,∆τ)]. Together these two steps provide an
estimate of E[∆ϕ|b P] i.e., of b β0X + b β1b P +b εU1E(b P). Third, we numerically differentiate this estimate
to obtain an estimate of the Marginal Treatment Effect. See appendix E for details.
6. Estimates of the Marginal Treatment Effect
Figure 5 reports our baseline estimate of the Marginal Treatment Effect i.e., of the impact of starting
to export on productivity for those plants that were induced to export because of the U.S. tariff
cuts. The horizontal axis is b P(X,∆τ).18 The left-hand vertical axis is the average annual log
point change in labour productivity and is comparable to the parameter estimates of β1q in table
4. The right-hand axis transforms this into the percentage change in labour productivity over
the eight years 1988-96.19 For example, plants with b P = 0.35 that started exporting because of
improvedmarketaccessareestimatedtohavehadlabourproductivitygrowththatwas40%higher
than nonexporters by 1996. On the other hand, plants with b P ≥ 0.6 are estimated to have had
virtually 0 labour productivity growth. The dashed lines are 95% conﬁdence intervals. These are
calculatedbybootstrappingtheentireestimationprocedure, includingtheprobitstage, using1,000
draws. The only statistically signiﬁcant labour productivity effects are for b P ≤ 0.6. Overall, the
labour productivity impacts for plants with b P ≤ 0.6 are both economically large and statistically
signiﬁcant.20
Interpreting b P as a measure of initial productivity ϕ0, we ﬁnd it of considerable interest that the
proﬁle in ﬁgure 5 is so similar to what is predicted by the theory in ﬁgure 3.
These results are very different from the OLS and IV results in table 4. If ﬁgure 5 had included
the OLS results from table 4, they would appear as a curve starting at 0.041 and ending at 0.022.
OLS thus underestimates the low-b P gains and over-estimates the high-b P gains. If ﬁgure 5 had
17This restriction that β1(X) be independent of X is tested and accepted (not rejected) in appendix E.
18To understand the labels on the horizontal axis, note that after estimating equation (11) we grouped plants into
11 groups based on their b P(X,∆τ): (.00,.05), (.05,.15), (.15,.25), ..., (.95,1.00). We then differentiated by differencing
neighbouringgroups. Thus, afterdifferentiatingwehave10cellsandthehorizontalaxisofﬁgure5labelstheboundaries
between these cells i.e., .05, .15, .25 etc.
19If ∆ϕ ≡ (ln ϕ1996 − ln ϕ1988)/8 is the value on the left-hand axis then 100 · [e8·∆ϕ − 1] = 100 · (ϕ1996 − ϕ1988)/ϕ1988
is the value on the right-hand axis.
20We have been reporting the effect of exporting on productivity. If one is interested in the effect of the tariff cut on
productivity then one must multiply the Marginal Treatment Effect by the induced probability of exporting because of
the tariff cut. That is, one must multiply ﬁgure 5 by the marginal effect of ∆τ reported in column 8 of table 3.
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Notes: This ﬁgure provides estimates of the Marginal Treatment Effect i.e., of the productivity gains over
the 1988-96 period for those plants that were induced to start exporting as a result of the U.S. tariff cuts.
The dashed lines are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
included the table 4 IV results, the shape of the proﬁle would be similar to the Marginal Treatment
Effect proﬁle except much higher and, for b P < 0.6, much steeper.
Heterogeneity means that the Marginal Treatment Effect varies across plants i.e., it means that
the ﬁgure 5 proﬁle has a non-zero slope. The conﬁdence intervals in ﬁgure 5 suggest that the slope
is signiﬁcantly different from 0. Appendix F provides a parametric slope test which conﬁrms this
insight (p = 0.0000).
Appendix F also provides a weak parametric test of overidentiﬁcation which exploits the fact
that b P(X,∆τ) is not linear in ∆τ. The test shows that ∆τ is statistically insigniﬁcant when included
22directlyinto theproductivitygrowthequation. Itscoefﬁcienthasa t-statisticof 0.41. Thus, thetariff
cuts do not directly affect productivity growth. This is useful evidence supporting the exogeneity
of the U.S. tariff cuts.
A. Sensitivity to Speciﬁcation of Tariff Cuts ∆τ and Exporter Status
Recall that a plant has ∆τ = 1 if its plant-speciﬁc tariff cut exceeds a threshold ∆τ which is the
average tariff cut across all 5,247 plants. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of threshold.
Figure 11 in appendix G plots the Marginal Treatment Effect for three alternative thresholds: (1)
50% below the average across all plants, (2) 50% above the average across all plants, and (3) ∆τ
equal to the median tariff cut across all plants. There are no statistically signiﬁcant differences
between these and the baseline results of ﬁgure 5.
A threshold that is the same for all industries will tend to have more variation across industries
than within industries: high-tariff industries will have many plants above the threshold and low-
tariff industries will have many plants below the threshold. An alternative that brings out the
within-industry variation in tariffs is a threshold ∆τ that is the average tariff cut for plants within
the industry. The left panel of ﬁgure 6 displays the results for this case along with the baseline
results from ﬁgure 5. The two results are similar, though the within results are somewhat smaller.
A problem with this ‘within’ approach is that all industries will have plants with ∆τ = 1, even
industries that had very low tariffs before 1988. To eliminate this problem we re-estimated the
model using only those industries that had deep tariff cuts. The middle panel of ﬁgure 6 plots the
Marginal Treatment Effect for the one third of industries that experienced the deepest tariff cuts
(70 industries, 70 ≈ 209/3). The right panel plots it for the one half of industries that experienced
the deepest tariff cuts (105 industries, 105 ≈ 209/3). These results are very similar to the baseline
results. This suggests that it is within-industry variation in high-tariff industries that is driving the
results.
7. Investing in Productivity
We have now accomplished the ﬁrst of two major goals of this paper: we have shown that there
were indeed labour productivity gains for low- and medium-productivity plants (b P < 0.6) that
were induced to export as a result of improved access to U.S. markets. Our second goal is to link































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24that the same plants that beneﬁted from being induced to export — plants with b P < 0.6 — were
also the plants that invested in product innovation and the adoption of advanced manufacturing
technologies. This is a long paper so it is perhaps useful at this point to ﬂag the importance of this
section.
Data are from the 1993 Survey of Innovation and Advanced Technologies (SIAT). The surveyed
plants include 521 plants that are in our group of 5,247 plants. The two-part survey deals with
(a) innovation and (b) the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies. See Baldwin and
Hanel (2003) for a description of the survey. We start with the technology-adoption questions.
The survey asks plants about their current use of various types of technologies and year of initial
adoption. The most important of these is manufacturing information systems (MIS) which deals
with computer-based production management and scheduling systems for orders, inventory and
ﬁnished goods. MIS also deals with computer-based management of machine loading, production
scheduling, inventory control and material handling. These systems are necessary for a variety of
productivity-enhancing production techniques such as just-in-time inventory and lean manufac-
turing. Investments in MIS are thus a central component of any productivity-enhancing change in
production techniques.
The ﬁrst set of results in table 5 reports data on MIS adoption rates over the 1989-93 period.
We start at 1989 because the Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1989. With only 521 plants
we cannot use the data-intensive non-parametric approaches used above. We start simply with
summaries of the raw adoption rates. We stratiﬁed the sample into two groups of plants, those
with b P < 0.6 and those with b P > 0.6. b P is from the table 2 probit. Within each of these two groups,
table 5 compares the adoption rates of new exporters and non-exporters. Among low-b P plants,
23% of new exporters adopted MIS between 1989 and 1993 whereas only 7% of non-exporters
had done so. Thus, new exporters were 215% (= (23 − 7)/7) more likely than non-exporters to
have adopted at least one advanced manufacturing technology by 1993. Among high-b P plants,
22% of new exporters had adopted at least one technology by 1993 and an almost identical 20% of
non-exporters had done so. Thus, among high-b P plants new exporters were only 11% more likely
than non-exporters to have adopted MIS. This means that among the group of plants where we
found higher productivity gains for new exporters than non-exporters (plants with b P < 0.6) new
exporters were adopting advanced technologies more frequently than non-exporters. In contrast,
among the group of plants where we did not ﬁnd differential productivity gains (plants with b P >
25Table 5. Post-Agreement Technology Adoption and Product Innovation
Without Plant Controls With Plant Controls
New Non- % Predicted % Double Difference
P( X, ∆τ ) Exporters Exporters Difference δ p-value δP p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1. Manufacturing Information Systems, Adopted in 1989-93
P < 0.6 0.23 0.07 215% 0.88 0.00 1.06 0.01 309
P > 0.6 0.22 0.20 11% -0.17 0.63 135
2. Inspection and Communications, Adopted in 1989-93
P < 0.6 0.26 0.15 77% 0.46 0.02 1.00 0.02 291
P > 0.6 0.19 0.24 -22% -0.56 0.15 119
3. Computer Aided Design and Engineering, Adopted in 1988-93
P < 0.6 0.25 0.18 36% 0.18 0.03 0.61 0.07 322
P > 0.6 0.33 0.42 -22% -0.45 0.11 148
4. Product Innovation without Process Innovation, Activities in 1989-91
P < 0.6 0.32 0.12 160% 0.65 0.00 0.89 0.01 350
P > 0.6 0.20 0.18 12% -0.29 0.36 171
Notes: Each plant was placed in either the b P(X,∆τ) < 0.6 group or the b P(X,∆τ) > 0.6 group where b P is the table
2 probit. Within each group new exporters are compared to non-exporters. Columns 2 and 3 report raw adoption
rates. Column 4 is 100·[(column 2)/(column 1) – 1]. Column 5 reports the coefﬁcient on E in a probit of technology
adoption on E (exporter status) and X (employment and productivity in 1984, productivity growth in 1984-88, and
2-digit SIC ﬁxed effects). The technology adoption probit was estimated separately for the two b P groups. Letting
DP = 1 if b P < 0.6 and DP = 1 otherwise, column 7 reports the coefﬁcient δP on E · DP in a probit of technology
adoption on E, X, E · DP and X · DP. This probit pools across the two b P groups. A low p-value indicates statistical
signiﬁcance.
260.6), new exporters were adopting advanced technologies about as frequently as non-exporters.
Column 5 of the table provides the p-value for a test that new exporters and non-exporters adopted
at the same rates. The adoption rates differed signiﬁcantly only for low-b P plants (p = 0.00), exactly
as predicted. We will explain how this p-value was estimated shortly.21
Looking at the other technologies, a similar pattern emerges. Inspection and communications
was, together with MIS, the big innovation being adopted in our period.22 The second set of
results in table 5 shows that for low-b P plants, new exporters were 77% more likely to have adopted
inspection and communications technologies during 1989-93 (p = 0.02). For high-b P plants, new
exporters were 22% less likely to adopt, a statistically insigniﬁcant difference.
The third set of results in table 5 deals with computer aided design and engineering. While
design and engineering differences appear in the 1989-93 period, a considerable amount of adop-
tion started in 1988. We therefore report results for 1988-93. The results are as expected, though
somewhat weaker than for MIS. Consistent with our theory, this likely reﬂects the fact that these
technologies are relatively inexpensive and hence are affordable even to nonexporters.23
Turning from processes to product innovation, the fourth set of results in table 5 is from the
1989-91 innovation component of the SIAT survey. The survey asks plants whether they were
active in product innovation during the 1989-91 period and if this innovation occurred without
any corresponding process innovation.24 For low-b P plants, new exporters were 160% more likely
than non-exporters to have engaged in such activities (p = 0.00). Again, there is no statistically
signiﬁcant difference for high-b P plants (p = 0.36).
We next turn to explaining how the statistical tests of the reported differences were estimated.
Let T be a plant-level binary indicator of MIS adoption during 1989-93. Let X be as in the probit
21One incorrect explanation of these results is that most high-b P plants had already adopted MIS and that what we
are picking up is technology stragglers. In fact, adoption of this technology (and of the others to be discussed) was
below 20% in 1988 for all four types of plants. On a separate note, this 20% is lower than one might guess from the
non-survey based evidence reported by Feinberg and Keane (2006) and Keane and Feinberg (forthcoming), but this
likely reﬂects their focus on U.S.-owned multinationals. These are particularly large and advanced continuous exporters
such as General Motors and are therefore not in our sample.
22Inspection and communications includes (a) automated sensor-based equipment used for inspection/or testing
of incoming materials, in-process materials and ﬁnal products (e.g., tests of failure rates); (b) local area networks for
technical data and factory use; inter-company computer networks linking the plant to subcontractors, suppliers and/or
customers; (c) programmable controllers; and (d) computers used for control on the factory ﬂoor.
23The survey also asks about automated material handling, integration and control software, and fabrication and
assembly. However, adoption rates for these technologies over the 1989-93 period were too infrequent (less than 10%)
to be used for inference.
24The question has a vague feeling to it, but this is the nature of questionnaires about innovation. The precise question
is as follows: “Please indicate the categories of your innovation activity for the period 1989-1991: Product innovations
without change in manufacturing technology.”
27Table 6. Investing in Productivity: Sensitivity Analysis
Without Plant Controls With Plant Controls
New Non- Difference Double Difference
P( X, ∆τ ) Exporters Exporters Difference δ t-stat δP t-stat N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1. Log Productivity Growth, 1988-96: Technology Subsample
P < 0.6 0.025 -0.004 0.029 0.036 3.70 0.044 2.73 350
P > 0.6 -0.004 0.011 -0.015 -0.008 -0.76 171
2. Log Productivity Growth, 1988-96: Full Sample
P < 0.6 0.018 -0.011 0.029 0.037 12.69 0.036 5.97 3,114
P > 0.6 -0.003 -0.008 0.005 0.001 0.25 2,133
3. Change in Output per Commodity, 1988-96
P < 0.6 0.059 -0.011 0.070 0.060 7.71 0.048 3.85 1,738
P > 0.6 0.040 0.028 0.012 0.012 1.45 1,084
Notes: See the text and notes to table 5 for a full explanation. Column 5 reports OLS estimates of the coefﬁcient on
E in a regression of the dependent variable on X and E. Column 7 reports the coefﬁcient on E · DP in a regression
of the dependent variable on X, E, DP, X · DP and E· DP. 2-digit SIC ﬁxed effects are used in the ﬁrst set of results
and 4-digit SIC ﬁxed effects are used in the second and third sets of results.
of table 2, but with 2-digit SIC ﬁxed effects. With so few plants, we cannot use the 208 4-digit SIC
ﬁxed effects that we have used elsewhere. We estimated a probit of T on X and E separately for
plants with b P < 0.6 and b P > 0.6. Let δ be the coefﬁcient on E. It measures the average adoption
rate difference between new exporters and non-exporters after controlling for plant characteristics
X. Columns 5-6 of table 5 report estimates of δ and their p-values. In all cases, the estimated
differences are statistically signiﬁcant for low-b P plants and statistically insigniﬁcant for high-b P
plants.
We also examined whether the difference for low-b P plants was statistically larger than the
difference for high-b P plants. Let DP be an indicator variable for whether b P < 0.6 or b P > 0.6.
We pooled all plants and estimated a probit of T on X, E, DP, X · DP and E · DP. Let δP be the
coefﬁcient on E · DP. A test of the difference of differences is the p-value on δP. See columns 7-8 of
table 5. The difference in differences are statistically signiﬁcant except for design and engineering.
Finally, we were concerned about the size and representativeness of the 521-plant sample from
the SIAT survey. Table 6 addresses this concern. It has the same structure as table 5, but the
28dependent variable is log labour productivity growth over 1988-96. Since this is a continuous
variable, we use OLS rather than a probit and estimate t-statistics. The ﬁrst group of results uses
only the plants in the SIAT subsample. The second group of results uses our full set of 5,247 plants.
As is apparent, the core results (columns 5 and 7) are almost identical for the two samples which
suggests that sample selection is not a problem. Interestingly, the t-statistics in columns 6 and 8
are much larger for the larger sample. This suggests that the relatively low statistical signiﬁcance
in table 5 is attributable to the relatively small sample size.
8. Problems with Labour Productivity
We have shown that for plants that were induced by U.S. tariff cuts to export, those with a low b P
experienced (1) high rates of investment in advanced technology adoption and product innovation
and (2) high rates of labour productivity growth. It is possible that the labour productivity growth
does not reﬂect any TFP growth, but instead reﬂects high rates of investment. This seems unlikely
— there is abundant and growing evidence that it is precisely investments in MIS and information
and communications technologies that drive TFP growth e.g., Stiroh (2002).
Unfortunately, we do not have the capital stock or investment data needed to back up this claim
for our particular sample.25 We do however have indirect ways. The ﬁrst and most important way
was suggested to us by Kala Krishna. New exporters obviously increased their sales relative to
non-exporters because new exporters started selling into the U.S. market. However, if there were
no difference in the TFP performance of new exporters relative to non-exporters, then we would
not expect new exporters to increase their domestic (Canadian) sales relative to non-exporters. Yet
this is exactly what happened.
We computed the Marginal Treatment Effect for the log change in domestic sales between 1984
and 1996. The methodology is identical to what we did for labour productivity in ﬁgure 5, with
just one difference: the dependent variable in equation (8) is the average annual log change in
domestic sales. Domestic sales are total sales less exports. Figure 7 shows the results. For b P < 0.5,
plants that were induced to export because of improved market access experienced statistically
signiﬁcant increases in domestic sales. Further, these increases were large. For example, for plants
25On purely theoretical grounds, with CES preferences and Cobb-Douglas production functions, value added per
worker is independent of productivity ϕ. On purely empirical grounds, value added per worker is highly correlated
with TFP. Not surprisingly, results using TFP typically carry over to labour productivity. See Amiti and Konings
(forthcoming) for a recent example.
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with b P = 0.35 the gains were 0.023 log points a year or 20% over 8 years. It is quite remarkable
how similar ﬁgure 7 is to ﬁgure 5. Nothing in our non-parametric econometric model imposes this
similarity.26
Figure 8 repeats the analysis using materials costs divided by shipments (middle panel) and
energy costs divided by shipments (right panel) as the dependent variables. In the region of
b P where we ﬁnd labour productivity gains we also ﬁnd reductions in input usage per unit of
shipments. This is suggestive of TFP gains.
The last set of results in table 6 suggests another source of productivity gains. The same plants
that experienced productivity gains also experienced economically and statistically signiﬁcant
gains in output per commodity.
One alternative explanation of our results is that they reﬂect systematic capacity utilization
differencesbetweennonexportersandnewexporters. Ifaplantexperiencesexcesscapacitythenits
sales and variable input usage (labour, materials and energy) will be low per unit of capital. Thus,
26It would have been preferable to work with the log change in domestic sales over 1988-96 rather than 1984-96. We
do not have the export data for 1988 needed to compute 1988 domestic sales. However, if we assume that exports were
0 in 1988 and use this assumption to compute log changes in domestic sales 1988-96, we obtain very similar results to
those reported in ﬁgure 7.
30Figure 8. Marginal Treatment Effect: Material and Energy Inputs Per Unit of Output
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P( X, ∆τ ) = Prob{ E = 1 | X, ∆τ }
its TFP and labour productivity will be low. Our results are therefore consistent with the following:
for low-b P plants, nonexporters have excess capacity relative to new exporters while for high-b P
plants, nonexporters have the same excess capacity as new exporters. We are dealing with eight-
year changes and hence with long-term capacity under-utilization, which is a much longer time
frame than is typical in discussions of procyclical productivity. This aside, Basu (1996, page 719)
tackles procyclical productivity using the key observation that ‘material growth is a good measure
of unobserved changes in capital and labor utilization.’ The capacity utilization explanation thus
predicts that for low–b P plants, new exporters should have materials-to-sales growth that is the
same as for nonexporters.27 Yet as was shown in ﬁgure 8, this is not the case. There is thus not
much support for an excess-capacity explanation of our results.28
27Or possibly higher due to diminishing returns to ﬁxed capital.
28Yet another explanation of our results is that low-b P new exporters are providing more goods purchased for resale.
However, our results in ﬁgures 7 and 8 are virtually unchanged when we use what Statistics Canada refers to as
‘manufacturing activity’ i.e., good produced on the shop ﬂoor.
319. Conclusions
This paper presented three core empirical results.
1. Figure 5 showed that there were labour productivity gains from exporting and investing for
Canadian manufacturing plants that were induced to export because of improved access to
the U.S. market. Further, these labour productivity gains were heterogeneous: only those
plants with low pre-Agreement productivity beneﬁtted.
2. Table 5 showed that the labour productivity gainers also had high post-Agreement adoption
rates of advanced manufacturing technologies and high post-Agreement levels of product
innovation. That is, the new exporters who gained did so by investing in productivity.
3. Figure 7 showed that the pattern of productivity gains mirrored the pattern of domestic
(Canadian) sales. The new exporters that experienced productivity gains increased their
Canadian sales relative to non-exporters. This is exactly what one would expect if the labour
productivity gains reﬂected underlying TFP gains.
We argued that these facts are consistent with a model featuring two-dimensional heterogeneity
i.e., heterogeneity in initial productivity as in Clerides et al. (1998) and Melitz (2003) and hetero-
geneityintheproductivitygainsfrominvesting. Inparticular, forhighlevelsofinitialproductivity,
ﬁrms sort into exporting without any implications for productivity growth, just as in the Melitz
model. However, for low levels of initial productivity there is a fundamental complementarity
between exporting and investing. Exporting makes it more proﬁtable to improve productivity
because it increases the output over which the productivity gains will be spread. Thus, there will
be plants that ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export and invest even though it is not proﬁtable only to export
or only to invest.
An important feature of our work is the goal of estimating a policy-relevant response. To
this end we identiﬁed a policy-relevant instrument for exporting, namely, plant-speciﬁc tariff
cuts mandated under the terms of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. This said, the fact
that productivity responses were estimated to have a large unobserved component makes the
implications for policy tricky. If there was no unobserved response heterogeneity (U1 = 0) then
the causal effect of interest would have been the IV estimate of the coefﬁcient on E and we would
have blithely claimed that this coefﬁcient is the effect of exporting on productivity for any plant that
32exports from any country. Obviously, this additional out-of-sample claim requires additional strong
assumptions, but assumptions that economists are typically comfortable making. When there is
unobserved heterogeneity, the assumptions are less comfortable. We know there were productivity
gains for a particular group of plants — Canadian manufacturing plants that were induced to start
exporting because of improved access to the U.S. market — but we are not claiming that these
gains will accrue to any plant that starts exporting. One way of making this point is to return to
our manager who is good both at exploiting export opportunities and at squeezing productivity
gains out of new investments. For our results to apply out of sample we would have to claim that
the out-of-sample distribution of managers (technically, the joint distribution of UE and U1) is the
same as our in-sample distribution of managers. We simply have no evidence on this claim one
way or the other. We are thus only answering a question about our sample.
This observation is important for thinking about how our results are related to those of Clerides
et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999). At ﬁrst blush it would appear that we are contradicting
their earlier ﬁndings. A more thoughtful interpretation deﬁnitely suggests otherwise. For one, the
distribution of unobservables (UE and U1) in their samples may differ from ours. For another, the
reason for exporting in Clerides et al. and Bernard and Jensen is certainly different from the reason
for exporting in our Canadian context. Thus, even if the distribution of unobservables in the three
samples were the same, the parts of the distribution that started to export are unlikely to be the
same. Differences in results are thus to be expected. It would thus be fascinating to see whether our
Canadian results carry over to other countries that actively pursued policies of opening up foreign
markets, particularly in countries with small domestic markets and hence large complementarities
between exporting and investing in productivity.
3310. Appendix
A. Theory
Let I be a binary indicator of whether the ﬁrm invests (I = 1) or not (I = 0). Let πI(E) be proﬁts as
in equations (1)-(2). The ﬁrm chooses one of four alternatives, (E,I) ∈ {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}.
Each line in ﬁgure 9 corresponds to an indifference condition between two alternatives. For
example, the comparison π1(1) = π0(1) is the horizontal line to the right of the Melitz cut-off
FE/τ−σA∗. The label is always above the line and indicates the region for which the inequality
holds. For example, π1(1) > π0(1) holds above the line and π1(1) < π0(1) holds below the line.
It is trivial to verify that the lines are correctly drawn.
Consider the region to the right of the Melitz cut-off. We know from equation (3) — see the
ﬁrst term and the discussion following the equation — that the ﬁrm always exports in this region.
We therefore only have to consider alternatives (E,I) = (1,1) and (E,I) = (1,0) i.e., we only have
to consider the horizontal line. Thus, the ﬁrm exports and invests above the horizontal line and
exports without investing below the horizontal line. This completes the proof for the region to the
right of the Melitz cut-off.
Now consider the region to the left of the Melitz cut-off, but to the right of FE
τ−σA∗ − FI
A. Since we
are to the left of the Melitz cut-off, the ﬁrm will never export without investing i.e., we can ignore
the choice (E,I) = (1,0). Above the solid line we have π1(1) > π0(0) and π1(1) > π1(0) i.e.,
(E,I) = (1,1) is preferred to (0,0) and (0,1). Hence, the ﬁrm exports and invests. Below the solid
line we have π1(1) < π0(0) and π1(0) < π0(0). Hence the ﬁrm neither exports nor invests. This
completes the proof of the theory in the main text, which assumed ϕ0 > FE
τ−σA∗ − FI
A.
Finally, consider the region to the left of FE
τ−σA∗ − FI
A. As in the previous paragraph, we need
not consider exporting without investing. Above the top solid line we have π1(1) > π1(0) and
π1(1) > π0(0). Hence, the ﬁrm exports and invests. Below the bottom solid line we have π1(0) <
π0(0) and π1(1) < π0(0). Hence the ﬁrm neither exports nor invests. Between the two solid lines
we have π1(1) < π1(0) and π1(0) > π0(0). Hence the ﬁrm invests without exporting.
B. Survivor Bias
Our data consist of plants that were not exporting in 1984 and survived until 1996. We have thus
dropped 1984 nonexporters that died before 1996. This creates the potential for survivor bias.
34Figure 9. Proof of the Theory
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However, any method for dealing with survivor bias will likely lead to larger estimates of the
Marginal Treatment Effect. To understand why note that dying plants experience rapidly declining
productivity. Griliches and Regev (1995) call this the ‘shadow of death’. If dying plants are also
nonexporters — which is highly likely — then including dying plants in the analysis effectively
lowers the productivity growth of nonexporters and hence raises the productivity growth of new
exporters relative to nonexporters. To examine this more formally, we started by dividing the
set of dying plants into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of plants that exited during 1989-
91. This group exited during the severe 1989-91 recession and before exports started increasing
in 1992. (Recall from ﬁgure 4 that exports were ﬂat during 1989-91 and almost doubled during
1992-96.) These plants thus died before the effects of the FTA were felt and hence contain little
information about these effects. Including them only spuriously biases up our estimates of the
Marginal Treatment Effect. The second group exited in 1992-95.
35To estimate a Marginal Treatment Effect with 1992-95 exiters we follow a common practice
in the labour literature of imputing the dependent variable for exiters e.g., Baker and Benjamin
(1997). In our context this means imputing a negative value to 1988-96 average annual log labour
productivity growth. We report results for the case where this productivity growth is assumed
to be −0.05, which implies a modest productivity fall of 33% spread out over 8 years. The result
appears in ﬁgure 10 as the curve labelled ‘Include 1992-95 Exiters.’ As expected, the effect is larger
than our baseline result carried over from ﬁgure 5. See the curve labelled ‘Baseline.’ When we
use a more realistic imputation (−0.173, which implies a productivity fall of 75% over 8 years) the
Marginal Treatment Effect doubles in size. In summary, accounting for survivor bias leads to larger
estimates of the Marginal Treatment Effect.29
C. Stopping to Export
We next turn to plants that stopped exporting. In addition to the 1984 and 1996 annual surveys
of manufacturing, the 1979 and 1990 surveys were the only other surveys that asked exporting
questions. Of our 5,247 plants that were nonexporters in 1984, 615 exported in 1979. These plants
thus stopped exporting between 1979 and 1984. To examine if this small group of plants has any
impactonourconclusionswedeletedthemfromoursample. There-estimatedMarginalTreatment
Effect appears in ﬁgure 10 as the curve labelled ‘Delete 1979 Exporters.’ The re-estimated Marginal
Treatment Effect is almost identical to our baseline speciﬁcation.
Interestingly, when we estimate the Marginal Treatment Effect just for the 615 plants that
exported in 1979 and stopped by 1984, the Marginal Treatment Effect is smaller for plants with
b P < 0.45. This appears as the curve labelled ‘1979 Exporters Only.’ It thus appears that less-
productive plants which exported previous to 1984 obtained less of a productivity kick from the
FTA inducement to export.
29On a related note, there is the question of whether our sample is representative. The 1984 survey was administered
to plants that accounted for a remarkable 91% of total manufacturing output. Thus, only 9% of 1984 output lies outside
our scope. Of this 9%, 3% was produced by plants with annual sales of less than $100,000, what Statistics Canada calls
‘short-form’ plants. The remaining 6% was produced by plants that primarily served as headquarters for multi-plant
ﬁrms. Some of our 1984 plants became short-form plants by 1996 and we therefore have less information for them about
exporting and commodity composition. These are plants that shrank since 1984, which is why they were demoted to
short-form status. Deleting them somewhat biases downward our results because it removes the worst-performing
nonexporters from the sample. Baldwin and Gu (2003, footnote 5) show that less than 1% of short-form plants export.
We also know that short-form plants are virtually never induced to export because of tariff cuts. (We have considerable
unreported evidence available on this point; however, one can already see it in table 3 which shows that the small
plants in our sample — which are typically bigger than short-form plants — were unlikely to be induced to export.)
We therefore follow Baldwin and Gu (2003) in assuming that 1984 nonexporters who became short-formers were not
induced to export.
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We next turn to 1990 exporters. Using our sample of 1984 nonexporters, we excluded plants
that exported in 1990 but stopped exporting by 1996. This appears as the ﬁgure 10 curve labelled
‘Delete 1990 Exporters.’ Once again, the results are very similar to our baseline speciﬁcation.30
D. Balancing
This section reports on the results discussed at the end of section 3. Each element of table 7 is a
difference in means between new exporters and nonexporters. The column headings indicate the
variable that is being differenced. The differences are computed separately for groups of plants
grouped according to b P. For example, for plants with b P ∈ (0.15,0.25), new exporters have 1984
log labour productivity that is 0.04 log points less than nonexporters. The differences are never
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Italics indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
30Interestingly, we could not estimate a Marginal Treatment Effect separately for these deleted plants. In the starting-
to-export probit (see table 2), ∆τ is economically and statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.24). This is the only instance in
this paper where ∆τ is not an absolutely excellent predictor of starting to export. Apparently these plants entered for
reasons that had little to do with the FTA and exited due to the severe 1989-91 recession.
37Table 7. Tests of the Balancing Hypothesis









1 .00-.05 -0.55 -0.52 -0.04
2 .05-.15 0.32 0.30 0.02
3 .15-.25 -0.04 -0.05 0.01
4 .25-.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
5 .35-.45 0.10 0.08 0.02
6 .45-.55 0.11 0.14 -0.03
7 .55-.65 0.06 0.07 -0.01
8 .65-.75 -0.05 -0.06 0.00
9 .75-.85 -0.11 -0.10 -0.01
10 .85-.95 -0.61 -0.64 0.02
11 .95-1.00 -2.18 -2.35 0.17
Notes: This table reports differences in means between new exporters
and nonexporters. The differenced variables are 1984 log labour produc-
tivity, 1984logemploymentand1984-88loglabourproductivitygrowth.
The differences are never signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Italics indicates
statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
38E. Details of Nonparametric Estimation
This appendix describes details of the estimation of the Marginal Treatment Effect. We follow
the multi-step procedure of Carneiro et al. (2003). The ﬁrst group of steps estimate equation (11)
non-parametrically and is essentially the non-parametric counterpart to the linear IV estimates of
β1q reported in column 5 of table 4. Let X0 consist of log productivity in 1984, log employment in
1984 and log productivity growth in 1984-1988. X is X0 plus the 4-digit industry ﬁxed effects. We
have assumed that β0(X) = β0X and β1(X) = β1 + β0
1X0. Let b P = b P(X,∆τ) be our probit estimate
from table 2. Plugging this information into equation (11) yields
E[∆ϕ|b P] = β0X + β1b P + β0
1X0 · b P + E[U1E|b P].
We non-parametrically estimate this equation as follows. (1) Regress ∆ϕ, X and X0 · b P on b P using
local linear regression. (2) Letting b ε∆ϕ, b εX, and b εX0P be the respective residuals from these regres-
sions, regress b ε∆ϕ on b εX and b εX0P using OLS in order to estimate β0 and β0
1.31 Empirically we ﬁnd
β0
1 = 0.32 Accordingly, we repeated step (1) without X0 · b P and step (2) without b εX0P. The resulting
estimates of the elements of β0 are −0.062 (t = −25.04) for 1984 log labour productivity, 0.004
(t = 2.24) for 1984 log employment and −0.329 (t = −37.20) for 1984-88 log labour productivity
growth. We do not report the estimated industry ﬁxed effects that are part of X. (3) Let b ε be the
residual from the step (2) regression. It is an estimate of β1b P+E[U1E|b P].33 Regressingb ε on b P using
local linear regression, we obtain a nonparametric estimate of b ε(b P). Putting steps (1)-(3) together
provides an estimate of E[∆ϕ|b P] which we denote by \ E[∆ϕ|b P] ≡ b β0X +b ε(b P).
The second group of steps involves estimating the derivative in equation (12). We do this by
numerically differentiating \ E[∆ϕ|b P]. Speciﬁcally, plants were divided into the 11 groups of table
3. Means of \ E[∆ϕ|b P] were then calculated for each group and derivatives were calculated by ﬁnite
differencing across neighbouring groups.34
31If the reader ﬁnds this difﬁcult to interpret, step 1 is related to the ﬁrst stage of IV and step 2 is related to the second
stage of IV.
32The elements of β0
1 are individually insigniﬁcant (t < 2.00 in all three cases) and jointly insigniﬁcant (F = 2.05 which
has a p-value of 0.031). Once again, this insigniﬁcance supports the balancing hypothesis.
33In discussing β1 we have been ignoring an identiﬁcation issue. To see it simply, suppose that U1 = c1 + c2 b P so that
E[U1E|b P] = c1 b P + c2(b P)2. Then β1 b P + E[U1E|b P] = (β1 + c1)b P + c2(b P)2. That is, only β1 + c1 is identiﬁed.
34Local linear regressions were done using the SAS LOESS procedure. The procedure uses optimal smoothing based
on Hurvich, Simonoff, and Tsai (1998).
39F. Two Parametric Speciﬁcation Tests
The aim of estimating heterogeneous responses translates into estimating whether E[∆ϕ|b P(X,∆τ)]
depends non-linearly on b P. To see this in the simplest way possible, rather than estimating
E[U1E|b P] non-parametrically, suppose we know that E[U1E|b P] = c0 + c1b P + c2(b P)2 + c3(b P)3 for
some unknown coefﬁcients ci, i = 0,...3. Then from equation (11) with X suppressed,
E[∆ϕ|b P] = (β0 + c0) + (β1 + c1)b P + c2(b P)2 + c3(b P)3. (13)
From equation (12), the Marginal Treatment Effect is (β1 + c1) + 2c2b P + 3c3(b P)2. This means that
there is heterogeneity only if c2 and/or c3 are not zero. In terms of ﬁgure 5, this means that the line
is non-horizontal only if c2 and/or c3 are not zero.
This parametric example motivates the simple parametric test of heterogeneity suggested by
Carneiro et al. (2003). Estimate equation (13) using OLS and test for c2 = c3 = 0. The t-statistics for
c2 and c3 are −5.39 and 4.39, respectively. The F-statistic for c2 = c3 = 0 is 18.31 (p = 0.000). Thus,
we can reject homogeneity. Similar results obtain using a fourth-order polynomial in equation (13).
In this case F = 18.56.
We can also use this parametric approach to construct an informal over-identiﬁcation test. Al-
though we have only one underlying instrument ∆τ, by transforming it non-linearly into b P(X ,∆τ)
we can use the non-linear functional form to identify a second instrument b P. See the discussion
at the end of section 4. This means that the functional form provides us with over-identiﬁcation.
It thus allows us to include ∆τ directly into the second stage i.e., into equation (13). When we
do so the t-statistic on ∆τ is 0.41. Thus, this informal over-identiﬁcation test leads us to reject the
hypothesis that ∆τ belongs in the second-stage productivity equation.
G. Sensitivity to the Tariff Threshold and Deﬁnition of New Exporters
Figure 11 shows that our results are not sensitive to the speciﬁcation of ∆τ. See the ﬁgure notes
and section 6 for a discussion.
Our results are also not particularly sensitive to the deﬁnition of exporting. Let r be the ratio of
exportstosales. Were-estimatedtheMarginalTreatmentEffectfortheone-halfofallnewexporters
in an industry with the largest values of r. We also used three-quarters in place of one-half. The
results appear in appendix ﬁgure 12 and are very similar to our ﬁgure 5 baseline results.








.05 .15 .25 .35 .45 .55 .65 .75 .85 .95
Probability of Entry into the U.S. Market

















































Notes: This ﬁgure provides estimates of the Marginal Treatment Effect using
different deﬁnitions of the U.S. tariff cut. A plant has ∆τ = 1 if its tariff cut
was deeper than some threshold ∆τ. In our baseline speciﬁcation of ﬁgure 5,
here labelled ‘Manufacturing Average (MA)’ , the threshold is the average tariff
cut for all plants. In ‘MA * 0.5’ the threshold is 50% below the average tariff cut
for all plants. In ‘MA * 1.5’ the threshold is 50% above the average tariff cut for
all plants. In ‘Industry Median’ the threshold is the median tariff in the industry.
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